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Abstract
A major concern about biofuels is that increasing biofuel feedstock demand reduces
availability of crops for food and feed leading to higher food prices. This paper
investigates relations between biofuel policies and prices of rapeseed, the major
feedstock used for biodiesel production in Europe, and the impact of rapeseed
prices on crop acreages in Germany and France. Biodiesel is an important biofuel
in Europe, and Germany and France are the largest biodiesel producers in Europe.
First, the various biofuel policies in Germany and France are discussed, followed
by an analysis of their eﬀects on rapeseed prices. Although theory indicates that
such eﬀects exist, we could not ﬁnd empirical evidence for them. Second, using
regional land use panel data from Germany and France we investigate empirically
whether crop shares have been aﬀected by rapeseed prices in the period 2000–2015
and whether these price eﬀects changed because of biofuel policy changes. Results
show that wheat shares in Germany and France did respond to rapeseed prices, but
barley shares did not. Moreover, mandatory blending introduced in Germany in
2007 and production quotas introduced in France in 2005 led to a stronger eﬀect of
rapeseed prices on wheat shares, but again did not aﬀect barley shares.
Keywords: Biofuel policies; crop shares; Europe; panel data; rapeseed prices.
JEL classifications: Q12, Q15, Q16, C23.
1. Introduction
In recent years the production and consumption of biofuels have increased in many
European countries. Biofuel policies are often considered as an important driver for
this growth. The European Union (EU) has formulated targets for the shares of
bioenergy in total energy demand. To meet these targets, countries have implemented
various policies such as mandatory blending of biofuels with regular fuel, tax exemp-
tions for (the share of) biofuels, and so forth. Together these measures eﬀectively
1Cornelis Gardebroek and Lieneke Baller are with the Agricultural Economics and Rural Policy
group at Wageningen University, The Netherlands. E-mail: koos.gardebroek@wur.nl for corre-
spondence. Jeﬀrey J. Reimer is with the Department of Applied Economics, Oregon State
University, USA. Our thanks are due to anonymous referees for their comments on an earlier
draft.
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raised the demand for crops that are used to a large extent in the production of biofu-
els, such as rapeseed which is the dominant feedstock used in European production of
biodiesel, which in turn is the major biofuel produced in Europe (USDA-FAS, 2015).
In theory this should have had an upward eﬀect on the prices of these crops (Busse
et al., 2012; De Gorter et al., 2013, 2015). Farmers are expected to have responded to
these higher prices by extending the acreage share of biofuel feedstock crops, at the
expense of crops that are predominantly used for food or feed, thereby lowering sup-
ply of the latter and raising their prices (Baﬀes and Haniotis, 2016).2
However, the eﬀect of biofuel policies on European crop acreages is not clear. For
a causal link between biofuel policies and crop acreages to exist two issues are impor-
tant. First, biofuel policies should have led to higher prices for crops that play an
important role in biofuel production such as rapeseed. Second, if these crop prices rise
relatively faster than prices of crops mainly used for food or feed, farmers should
respond to these higher relative prices by expanding the areas planted with these
crops. Although both issues seem straightforward and plausible, it turns out that ﬁnd-
ing empirical evidence for this is not so easy, particularly for the link between biofuel
policies and prices. Available price data are limited and during the years of biofuel
policies, crop prices have also been aﬀected by other factors, obscuring the eﬀect of
biofuel policies. Moreover, prices of major global commodities such as wheat are
strongly inﬂuenced by international markets.
The objectives of this study are to investigate the relationship between biofuel poli-
cies and prices of rapeseed, the major feedstock used for biodiesel production in Eur-
ope, and to analyse the impact of rapeseed prices on crop acreages in Germany and
France. We restrict ourselves to biodiesel because its production is more developed in
Europe than ethanol production [biodiesel quantities produced exceed those of etha-
nol about 2 to 3 times (Sorda et al., 2010; USDA-FAS, 2015)]. Moreover, European
biodiesel production is largely based on rapeseed (Hamelinck et al., 2011; USDA-
FAS, 2015), whereas ethanol in Europe is produced from many diﬀerent feedstocks.3
Germany and France are studied because of their dominant role in biodiesel produc-
tion in Europe. First, the various biofuel policies in Germany and France are dis-
cussed, followed by an analysis of their eﬀects on rapeseed prices. Second, using
regional land use panel data from Germany and France we investigate empirically
whether crop shares have been aﬀected by rapeseed prices in the period 2000–2015
and whether these price eﬀects changed because of biofuel policy changes. For this
analysis we use German regional data from 2000 to 2015 and French regional data for
the period 2000–2013 to estimate crop share equations using panel data econometrics,
accounting for spatial serial correlation. Speciﬁc focus is on the eﬀect of rapeseed
prices on the crop shares of wheat, barley and rapeseed and on changes in this price
eﬀect due to biofuel policies.
2Note there is no clear distinction between biofuel crops and food or feed crops, e.g. rapeseed is
processed into rapeseed oil and rapemeal. The former is to a large extent used for biodiesel pro-
duction, whereas the latter is used as animal feed. Wheat is mainly used for food and feed, but
in recent years also 3% of European wheat is used in ethanol production (USDA-FAS, 2015).
3Hamelinck et al. (2011) show that the feedstock composition for ethanol production in France
in 2008 was 36% wheat, 16% corn, 38% sugarbeet and 10% wine. For Germany ethanol feed-
stock consisted of 21% wheat, 9% corn, 5% barley, 11% rye, 2% triticale, 26% sugarbeet, 4%
other and 21% unknown.
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This study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, we provide a panel data
econometric analysis on the impact of biodiesel feedstock (rapeseed) prices on crop
shares at a regional level. Most existing studies use a simulation approach to assess
land use changes induced by biofuel policies (e.g. Fabiosa et al., 2010; Laborde and
Valin, 2012; Timilsina et al., 2012). Notable exceptions are Langpap and Wu (2011)
and Hausman (2012) who use regional data and econometric approaches to analyse
land use changes due to biofuel policies in the US and Brazil, respectively. Economet-
ric evidence is important since many economists and policy-makers often refer to the
eﬀect of biofuels on food prices without being able to present empirical evidence for
this link relying instead on theoretical insights or indirect evidence such as price corre-
lations (Gilbert, 2010). Br€ummer et al. (2016) reviewed many recent papers discussing
food price volatility and conclude that the majority of papers linking biofuel policies
to food price volatility do not provide empirical evidence, whereas those that do
mainly focus on market price relations without focusing on production levels or
acreages. Partial and general equilibrium studies also presume the existence of this
link in the models used. Econometric estimation of producer responses can provide
evidence for the existence of land use changes due to biofuel policies.
Second, we provide evidence for the debate over biofuel policies on land use in Eur-
ope, which has a strong emphasis on rapeseed based biodiesel production. Whereas
many studies analyse land use changes due to ethanol production in the US (e.g. Feng
and Babcock, 2010; Piroli et al., 2012) or Brazil (Hausman, 2012), the evidence for
Europe is rather limited. Although Banse et al. (2008), Gohin (2008) and Laborde
and Valin (2012) explicitly consider the eﬀects of European biofuel directives on land
use, they only do so for the EU as a whole using computable general equilibrium
(CGE) analysis, even though there are large diﬀerences in biofuel production within
European countries. Kretschmer et al. (2009) and Timilsina et al. (2012) do consider
various European countries and regions in their CGE analysis of biofuel targets, but
these studies focus on long-run projections for 2020 instead of analysing land use
changes due to current policies as done in this study. Blanco et al. (2010) use three dif-
ferent models to analyse eﬀects of biofuel policies, of which two allow for EU coun-
try-speciﬁc analyses. These models also allow for analysing commodity markets and
land use together. All these models focusing on Europe use a simulation approach
though and often make predictions for the distant future. Our goal, by contrast, is to
investigate econometrically to what extent acreages in Germany and France did
respond to price changes in recent years in the light of recent biofuel policies.
In the remainder of this paper, section 2 summarises the general European biofuel
policy framework and its implementation in Germany and France. Section 3 discusses
the eﬀect of biofuel policies on rapeseed prices. Section 4 focuses on the relationship
between relative crop prices and crop acreages. Section 5 provides conclusions and
policy implications.
2. European Biodiesel Production and Policies Stimulating Biofuels
2.1. Production and trade of rapeseed, rapeseed oil and biodiesel in Germany and
France
In line with developments worldwide, the production of biofuels has increased in Eur-
ope in recent years. However, there are substantial diﬀerences in biofuel production
and policies among European countries. An interesting feature of European biofuel
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production is the importance of biodiesel production, whereas other major global bio-
fuel producers (USA, Brazil) mainly produce ethanol. Ethanol is also produced in
Europe but to a lesser extent. Historically, Germany and France have been the major
producers of biodiesel in Europe. Table 1 shows biodiesel production quantities and
shares in 2006 and 2014 for the top ﬁve European biodiesel producers of 2014.
Although the combined share of Germany and France went down from more than
70% in 2006 to 46% in 2014 the latter is still a sizeable share. The drop in market
share can be explained by relatively new biodiesel producers such as the Netherlands
and the expansion in other European countries. However, production in these coun-
tries is often based on hydrotreated vegetable oils or imported palm oil (USDA-FAS,
2015), whereas biodiesel in Germany and France is largely based on rapeseed pro-
duced domestically.
Table 2 presents production, trade and consumption ﬁgures of rapeseed and rape-
seed oil for Germany, France in 2006 and 2015.
Additional data from Oilworld, ISTA Mielke GmbH indicates that in 2015 biodiesel
produced in Germany was for 82% based on rapeseed oil (11% based on used waste
oils and fats, 4% based on palm oil), whereas in the same year in France 61% of biodie-
sel produced was based on rapeseed oil (20% used waste oils and fats, 14% palm oil).
2.2. Biofuel related policies
Policies related to biodiesel production are part of more general biofuel policies in
Europe. These policies exist at two diﬀerent levels. At the EU level there are general
policies formulated that provide a framework for individual implementation at
national level, allowing individual countries to meet EU targets using diﬀerent instru-
ments. Blanco et al. (2010) distinguish four groups of instruments to stimulate biofu-
els: (i) budgetary support including direct support to biomass supply and tax
exemptions for biofuel producers, (ii) blending or use targets (mandates), (iii) interna-
tional trade measures, and (iv) measures to stimulate eﬃciency and productivity of
the biofuel-chain. Some of these policies are set at EU level (e.g. Common Agricul-
tural Policy (CAP) instruments and international trade measures), whereas others can
be set at national level (e.g. tax exemptions and blending mandates). Next, we give a
short overview of general EU policies followed by a review of speciﬁc policies imple-
mented in Germany and France.
Table 1
European production of biodiesel in 2006 and 2014*
2006 2014
Germany 2,066 (56.2%) 3,043 (27.1%)
France 526 (14.3%) 2,075 (18.4%)
The Netherlands 16 (0.4%) 1,520 (13.5%)
Spain 57 (1.6%) 1,071 (9.5%)
Poland 82 (2.2%) 653 (5.8%)
EU28-total 3,674 11,247
Notes: *In thousand tons of oil equivalent.
Source: Eurostat (2017b).
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In 2003 two EU directives were formulated that provided general directions for EU
biofuel policy. The 2003 EU Biofuels Directive (2003/30/EC) speciﬁed a targeted
share of 2% of biofuels in total fuel use by 2005 rising to 5.75% in 2010 to be attained
by all Member States, although the targets were not considered as binding (Cansino
et al., 2012). By 2010 these targets were not reached, with only a 1% share in 2005
and a 4.2% share in 2010 (Sorda et al., 2010). The second important directive is the
2003 EU Energy Tax Directive (2003/96/EC), which provided a general framework
for individual Member States to specify biofuel tax reductions or exemptions.
The 2009 Renewable Energy Directive (2009/28/EC), which amended and repealed
the 2003 EU Biofuels Directive (2003/30/EC), speciﬁed a mandatory target for all
Member States of at least 10% biofuels in transport fuels by 2020. Sustainability
requirements were also speciﬁed relating to greenhouse gas emission reductions and
acceptable land use changes (Blanco et al., 2010; Sorda et al., 2010). To assure com-
mitment with these targets, Member States had to compose national action plans for
stimulating the use of bioenergy (European Parliament and Council, 2009). In 2015
the Renewable Energy Directive was revised, capping the ‘share of energy from biofu-
els produced from cereal and other starch-rich crops, sugars and oil crops and from
crops grown as main crops primarily for energy purposes on agricultural land’ (Euro-
pean Parliament and Council, 2015) to a maximum of 7% of the ﬁnal consumption of
energy in transport in the Member States in 2020. This change intended to limit land
use changes from food to biofuel feedstock production. The revised directive also
requires countries to report on indirect land use changes due to biofuels.
Besides these speciﬁc biofuel policies the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
also aﬀected acreages of biodiesel feedstock crops. For example, in the period 1992–
2008 production of oilseeds was supported by area payments, although the so-called
Blair House Agreement in the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations, approved by the
European Council in June 1993, restricted the number of hectares planted with oil-
seeds and eligible for area payments to about 5 million hectares. In addition set-aside
Table 2
Balance sheet of rapeseed and rapeseed oil (1,000 ton)
Germany France
2006 2015 2006 2015
Production rapeseed 5,337 4,920 4,144 5,307
Net imports rapeseed (imports-exports) 1,556 4,615 1667 323
Net stocks (beginning-ending stocks) 67 70 111 110
Crushing of rapeseed 6,775 9,330 2,328 4,781
Other use of rapeseed 51 135 260 93
Production rapeseed oil 2,679 4,223 1,030 2,055
Net imports rapeseed oil (imports-export) 833 655 268 150
Domestic disappearance rapeseed oil* 3,448 3,583 762 1,907
Use of rapeseed oil in biodiesel 2,260 2,450 420 1,245
Use of rapeseed oil for energy/heating 100 140 0 0
Use of rapeseed oil for industrial, food and other 1,088 993 342 662
Notes: *Diﬀerence between this value and sum of production plus net imports is due to small
stocks.
Source: Oilworld, ISTA Mielke GmbH.
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land, which was introduced in the EU by the 1992 MacSharry reform, could be used
to produce oilseed not for food or feed to the equivalent of 1 million tons of soybean
meal. This planting of oilseeds on set-aside land gave an early stimulus to biodiesel
production in Germany and France (Kutas et al., 2007; Bureau et al., 2010; Sorda
et al., 2010) even though the biodiesel industry mainly developed after 2003. With the
introduction of the Single Farm Payment in the 2003 CAP reform, the area support
to oilseeds was reduced to the same level as that for cereals. However, at the same
time an energy crop payment of 45 Euros per hectare grown with energy crops was
introduced under the conditions that the farmer had a written contract with a biofuel
producer for the supply of the crop and that the crop was not grown on set-aside land.
Moreover, the total area in the EU eligible for this area payment was capped to 1.5
million hectares (Council of the EU, 2003). The CAP Health Check reform in 2008
abolished the area payments for oilseeds, including the energy crop scheme, and ended
the set-aside provisions.
2.2.1. Germany
In line with the 2003 EU Biofuels Directive (2003/30/EC) Germany set an initial tar-
get of a 2.5% market share (in energy content) of all transport biofuels in total trans-
port fuels for 2005, increasing to 5.75% for 2010. However, in 2005 Germany already
had a market share of 3.75% exceeding the target (Kutas et al., 2007). Since January
2007 mandatory targets for transport biofuels have been in place with speciﬁc targets
for biodiesel. Over the period 2007–2013 at least 4.4% of all diesel used in transport
should have been biodiesel (Cansino et al., 2012; Rauch and Th€one, 2012). From
2014 onwards, mandates for biodiesel were based on biodiesel greenhouse gas emis-
sion savings in relation to fossil fuels (Rauch and Th€one, 2012). In 2014 the share of
all biofuels in total transport fuels was 6.6% (Eurostat, 2017a).
Next to targets and mandates, Germany also stimulated production and consump-
tion of biodiesel using tax measures complying with the 2003 EU Energy Tax Direc-
tive (2003/96/EC). From January 2004 pure biodiesel (B100) was eﬀectively
subsidised by exempting it from excise taxes. In August 2006 this policy was partly
reversed by introducing a partial energy tax for pure biodiesel and a full energy tax
for blends up to 5% (Busse et al., 2012). Since January 2007 only pure biodiesel in
excess of the mandate was subject to tax rebates, although these tax rebates ended in
January 2013.
In 2011 additional sustainability requirements on biodiesel used in quotas were
implemented in order to comply with the EU 2009 Renewable Energy Directive
(2009/28/EC). Mandated biodiesel should be 35% less carbon intensive than oil-based
diesel and there are speciﬁc requirements with respect to land use changes. These sus-
tainability criteria led to a competitive disadvantage of rapeseed-based biodiesel since
it only counted once in the mandate, whereas biodiesel based on used cooking oil, ani-
mal fat or non-cellulosic matter counted double and second-generation biofuels even
higher.
2.2.2. France
For 2005 France had a target of 1.2% biofuels in total transport fuels, but the market
share in 2005 was only 0.97%, slightly below the target (Kutas et al., 2007). Between
2005 and 2010 targets were gradually increased to 7% for both ethanol and biodiesel
in 2010 (Sorda et al., 2010). In July 2005 the French government adopted a National
 2017 The Agricultural Economics Society
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Energy Strategy, which included setting minimum production quota for biodiesel, 0.4
million ton in 2005 increasing to 3.1 million ton in 2010 (Kutas et al., 2007; Charles
et al., 2013). These quotas are not oﬃcial mandates as in Germany, but the simultane-
ous introduction of a general tax on polluting activities in 2005 (Taxe Generale sur les
Activites Polluantes, TGAP), which fuel resellers have to pay in addition to excise
taxes if they do not meet the yearly target, actually made these quotas a ‘quasi-obliga-
tion system’ since the high level of this tax gave fuel resellers a strong incentive to meet
the targets (Kutas et al., 2007; Wiesenthal et al., 2009). Biodiesel producers tender for
production quotas that are allocated for six years and non-compliance with the quota
implies paying the TGAP.
Next to this combination of production quotas and TGAP, biodiesel is also partly
exempted from excise taxes. However, these tax exemptions only apply to biodiesel
within the production quotas and they have been reduced over time from €0.33/l in
2004 to €0.08/l in the period 2011–2015 (Jung et al., 2010; Charles et al., 2013).
These quota levels comply with the targets set in the EU 2009 Renewable Energy
Directive (2009/28/EC). Domestic measures taken in order to comply with the Direc-
tive’s sustainability criteria and progress therein are documented in yearly national
progress reports (e.g. Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable Development and Energy,
2013). In 2014 the share of all biofuels in total transport fuels in France was 7.8%
(Eurostat, 2017a).
3. The Impact of Biofuel Policies on Rapeseed Prices
3.1. Theoretical considerations
The theoretical eﬀects of biofuel policies on crop prices and biofuel prices have been
extensively described in, for example, Busse et al. (2012) and De Gorter et al. (2015).
These studies argue that biofuel policies increase demand for biodiesel, thereby raising
demand for rapeseed oil and therefore indirectly demand for rapeseed itself, which has
an upward eﬀect on rapeseed prices. However, since production of rapeseed oil from
rapeseed leads to the by-product rapemeal that can be used as animal fodder, an
increase in biodiesel production leads to larger supply of rapemeal, depressing its price.
This implies that the upward eﬀect of biofuel policies on rapeseed prices is reduced
somewhat by the decline in rapemeal prices. Nevertheless, De Gorter et al. (2015, pp.
153–154) suggest that the positive eﬀect of biofuel policies on feedstock prices remains.
De Gorter et al. (2015, pp. 29–35) also show a theoretical indirect eﬀect of biofuel
policies, in that they connect biofuel prices (and therefore indirectly biofuel feedstock
prices) to gasoline or diesel prices, albeit in diﬀerent ways for a tax credit and a blend
mandate, two major biofuel policies used. A tax credit leads to a positive correlation
between rapeseed and diesel prices, whereas the relationship in theory is negative for a
blend mandate. The latter is due to the (slightly) upward sloping supply curve for blends.
An increase in diesel prices, leads to a reduction in demand for blends, thereby reducing
the demand for biodiesel and thereby rapeseed oil and rapeseed, lowering their prices.
3.2. Biodiesel and rapeseed prices under various policy regimes
We investigate whether biofuel policies had an impact on biodiesel and rapeseed
prices in the period January 2000 to December 2015 for both countries. For Germany
monthly prices for diesel, biodiesel, rapeseed oil, rapeseed and rapemeal are plotted in
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Figure 1 (see note below Figure 1 for data sources and deﬁnition).4 Note that
monthly data before July 2002 were not available for biodiesel. This ﬁgure generates a
number of interesting observations. First, prices of biodiesel closely follow diesel
prices, as expected. Given this observation, it seems most likely that the increase of
biodiesel prices since 2004 is due to the increase in diesel prices and not due to the tax
exemptions introduced in 2004. This conclusion is supported by the observation that
both rapeseed and rapeseed oil prices decreased somewhat after June 2004 and
remained at a low level until spring 2007, a period in which biodiesel rose steadily. As
discussed above, in theory the tax exemptions strengthened the correlation between
diesel and biodiesel (feedstock) prices. Interestingly, when the tax exemptions were
largely abolished in August 2006, the German biodiesel price rapidly dropped (Fig-
ure 1). But this coincided with a drop in conventional diesel and global crude oil
prices between August 2006 and January 2007 (EIA, 2016). Rapeseed prices increased
modestly in these months. So, the direct policy eﬀects of the 2004 tax exemptions and
their abolition in August 2006 did not seem to inﬂuence German rapeseed prices. The
eﬀects of these policies on biodiesel prices are more diﬃcult to assess because they
coincided with changes in global diesel and crude oil prices that in themselves already
had an impact on biodiesel prices.5
A direct price eﬀect of the mandatory blending policy introduced in January 2007 is
also hard to discern from Figure 1. During this policy regime all commodity prices
initially increased culminating in the 2008 price spike and the subsequent drop in
prices in 2009 followed by the gradual recovery of most prices. Interestingly, the poli-
cies that seemed to have been most inﬂuential for rapeseed and rapeseed oil prices are
the additional sustainability requirements for biofuels that were introduced in Ger-
many in January 2011. Rapeseed oil became less competitive for biodiesel production
compared to other biodiesel feedstocks. This is reﬂected in a drop in the price of rape-
seed oil and, to a lesser extent, the price of rapeseed. Note that the biodiesel price itself
also dropped, whereas the regular diesel price continued to increase until September
2012. After that all commodity prices started to decline, well before the phasing out of
the partial tax exemptions on pure biodiesel in excess of the mandate that became
eﬀective in January 2013.
For France only monthly diesel prices and rapeseed prices were available and these
are plotted in Figure 2. The French wheat price is also plotted in order to compare
price movements of both commodities. The relevant French policy change was the
introduction of the minimum production quotas for biodiesel in July 2005 with
increasing quota levels and decreasing tax exemption rates since then. However, Fig-
ure 2 shows that the introduction of this policy did not seem to have much of an eﬀect
on French rapeseed prices. Although French rapeseed prices increased after July 2005
they followed a very similar trajectory as German rapeseed prices, for which we have
4German biodiesel prices are available from UFOP, a producer organisation aimed at promot-
ing the use of oilseeds that was founded in 1990 by the German farmers organisation (DBV)
and the organisation for plant breeders (BDP) in Germany. They publish monthly bulletins and
statistics about general developments regarding biofuels. At the time of the analysis monthly
UFOP reports were only available back to July 2005. However, Busse et al. (2012) provide
weekly UFOP prices dating back to July 2002. These were used to calculate monthly averages
for the period July 2002–June 2005.
5Given the relatively small share of biofuels in total fuel consumption, it is plausible to assume
that biofuel policies have no impact on crude oil and diesel prices.
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already concluded that they followed the general trend in commodity prices and not
so much the German biodiesel price.6 This is conﬁrmed by Figure 2 which shows that
French rapeseed and wheat prices follow a similar trajectory both before and after the
introduction of production quota. Interestingly, the price gap between rapeseed and
wheat seems to widen after 2010. Nevertheless, similar to the German case, the graph
does not provide much evidence for an eﬀect of French biofuel policies on rapeseed
prices.
4. The Impact of Relative Crop Prices on Crop Acreages
4.1. Introduction
Many crop prices have ﬂuctuated dramatically in recent years. However, for farmers
relative crop prices are relevant in acreage allocation decisions (e.g. Fezzi and Bate-
man, 2011). In this section we analyse whether acreages of major crops in Germany
and France have changed due to changes in relative crop prices. In particular we focus
on the eﬀect of relative rapeseed prices on the acreage shares of wheat and barley, the
two main cereals grown in both countries. Section 4.2 discusses the micro-economic
framework used, section 4.3 the estimation approach, section 4.4 presents the regional
panel data used in the empirical analysis and some preliminary statistics, and section
4.5 presents the estimation results of this econometric analysis.
4.2. Micro-economic crop share model
To analyse the eﬀects of price changes on crop shares, a micro-economic crop share
model is speciﬁed and estimated using regional data from Germany and France.
Using micro-economic production theory, it is assumed that farmers in a region max-
imise proﬁts, given exogenous crop prices, variable input prices, and land that can be
allocated to the various crops. From this proﬁt maximisation problem, a system of
optimal acreage share equations can be derived by equating the shadow price equa-
tions for the various crop acreage shares and solving these conditions for the various
shares (Moore and Negri, 1992; Wu and Segerson, 1995; Fezzi and Bateman, 2011;
Kaminski et al., 2013). Let i or j index crops, where i = 1, . . ., h and k index inputs,
k = 1, . . ., K. More formally, the land allocation problem based on an optimal proﬁt
function is written as:
p p;w;Lð Þ ¼ max
s1;...;sh
p p;w;L; s1; . . .; shð Þ½  s:t:
Xh
i¼1
si ¼ 1 ð1Þ
where p denotes proﬁts, p is a vector of crop prices, w is a vector of variable input
prices, L is total land, and si are acreage shares of the various crops. For a given total
area of land L, optimal crop shares are reﬂected in the equality of marginal proﬁts
with respect to shares:
6The fact that monthly French and German rapeseed prices are strongly related (correlation
coeﬃcient 0.997) is not surprising since we can expect these markets to be connected. Table 2
already showed that in this period France was a net exporter of rapeseed and Germany a net
importer and since both countries are by far the largest European producers of both biodiesel
and rapeseed, it is very plausible that part of the French rapeseed was exported to Germany,
linking French and German rapeseed prices.
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@p p;w;L; s1; . . .; shð Þ
@s1
¼ @p p;w;L; s1; . . .; shð Þ
@si
for i ¼ 2; . . .; h: ð2Þ
Using a ﬂexible functional form for the proﬁt function with prices normalised to
ensure homogeneity in prices (that is, the Normalised Quadratic), this leads to a set of
optimality conditions that can be solved to obtain the following reduced-form share
equations:
si ¼ ai þ
XJ
j¼1
aijp
n
j þ
XK
k¼1
bikw
n
k þ diL ð3Þ
where superscript n indicates that output and input prices are normalised by a numer-
aire price. Although these share equations reﬂect optimal cropping decisions of indi-
vidual farmers, they can also be used to analyse crop allocation at a regional level
since this is the aggregate of the individual crop allocation decisions. For regional
data it is plausible to assume constant returns to scale per unit of land and therefore L
can be dropped from the equation (Fezzi and Bateman, 2011).
4.3. Estimation approach
Equation (3) provides a share equation for each crop, so in principle a system of share
equations could be estimated for each country. We only estimate the share equations
of wheat, barley and rapeseed as a function of all relevant crop prices in a country
since not all crops are grown in all regions. For example, whereas sunﬂower is an
important oilseed crop in many southern regions of France, it is not grown in north-
ern France nor in most German regions.7 Similarly, some French regions have a zero
share of sugar beet. Estimating a system of share equations for all crops in all regions
would lead to many zero values for the dependent variables, which is problematic in
estimation.8 Wheat, barley and rapeseed are major crops grown in all regions consid-
ered, usually together with one or more of the other crops. Moreover, the main inter-
est in this study is investigating whether rapeseed prices aﬀect crop shares of the main
cereals wheat and barley. Therefore, share equations for wheat, barley and rapeseed
are estimated for Germany and France with relevant crop prices for each country
included as explanatory variables. Since we want to disentangle the own price eﬀects
of wheat and barley from rapeseed price eﬀects, all prices are normalised by potato
prices, another crop grown in all regions.
Another issue considered in estimation is the time lag in responses to crop prices. If
prices are high in a certain year, farmers can only respond the year after by adjusting
their cropping plan. Therefore, we use one-year lagged prices as determinants for the
crop shares.
The country-speciﬁc crop share equations are estimated using observations for the
various regions over multiple years. Besides output and input prices, crop shares may
also vary due to other factors such as diﬀerences in climate, soil types, regional
7Sunﬂower is mainly used to produce cooking oil and is less suitable for biodiesel production
(USDA-FAS, 2015).
8Although this could technically be solved by estimating a system of Tobit equations, this intro-
duces another problem, i.e. the impossibility of imposing cross-equation restrictions in the
resulting non-linear system of equations.
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policies, and the presence of a biodiesel production plant. The panel data structure
allows for dealing with this unobserved heterogeneity in estimation by including regio-
nal ﬁxed eﬀects in the equation to be estimated:
sirt ¼ lir þ
XJ
j¼1
aijp
n
ijrt þ
XK
k¼1
bikw
n
ikrt þ eirt ð4Þ
where lir are regional ﬁxed eﬀects and eirt are residuals for region r and time period t
in the share equation for crop i. Fixed eﬀects are used instead of random-speciﬁc
eﬀects due to the limited number of regions in our dataset, making the assumption of
randomly distributed speciﬁc eﬀects implausible.9 Given that we use crop shares from
neighbouring regions, the standard assumption of independent and identically dis-
tributed (i.i.d.) residuals may not be valid due to spatial autocorrelation, leading to
incorrect standard errors. To test for spatial correlation we use a non-parametric test
suitable for data with small T as developed by Frees (1995) and implemented in Stata
by De Hoyos and Saraﬁdis (2006). In the case of spatial correlation, standard errors
robust to such cross-sectional dependence are presented (Driscoll and Kraay, 1998;
Hoechle, 2007).
4.4. Data sources, deﬁnitions and overview
Regional data on crop acreages and input and output price indices were collected
from Eurostat for diﬀerent regions in Germany and France. For both countries only
regions with major cropland areas were selected. A number of very small, often urban,
regions were excluded. See Appendix Table A1 for a detailed list of selected regions.
Data were available for 13 regions of Germany for the period 2000–2015 and 21
regions of France for 2000–2013 resulting in a dataset of 502 observations.
In calculating the crop shares we considered acreages of wheat, barley, rapeseed,
potatoes, sugar beet and sunﬂower, the latter being only included for France. These
are major crops grown by arable farmers in both countries and enable a focus on
the substitution of rapeseed for wheat and barley.10 For these crops real output price
indices per crop per country are used in the empirical analysis. Price indices of the
following variable inputs are also used in the analysis: seeds and planting stock,
energy, fertilisers and soil improvements, and plant protection products and
pesticides.
Table 3 gives an overview of the data used in the empirical analysis. Acreage shares
were calculated by dividing each crop area by the sum of the areas of the considered
crops in a particular region and year.11
9Moreover, the price data used is at the national level so that only within variation is present. A
random eﬀects estimation procedure therefore does not lead to eﬃciency gains in estimation.
This was reﬂected in very low values for between R2 in contrast to reasonable values for within
R2. The standard panel Hausman test for ﬁxed against random eﬀects is therefore not applied.
10Although we could add acreages of remaining smaller crops (e.g. pulses) into a category
‘Other’ it is diﬃcult to come up with a relevant price index for such an aggregate category.
11Since these calculated shares are based on only the product groups considered, these shares
are not the actual shares in crop production. However, actual shares could not be obtained
since there were many missing and unreliable values for total crop land in Eurostat. Acreages
for these major crops are widely available and appear to be consistent.
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Table 3 shows that wheat dominates arable land use with an average share of 0.449
for German regions and 0.528 for French regions. Nevertheless, the standard devia-
tions of 0.05 for Germany and 0.149 for France show there is substantial variation in
wheat shares over regions and years, particularly for France with a minimum share of
0.095 in Languedoc-Roussillon to a maximum share of 0.763 in Pays de la Loire. Bar-
ley is the second crop in both countries, followed by rapeseed.
Table 4 shows the evolution of the average calculated shares of wheat, barley
and rapeseed. This table shows that for Germany as a whole the share of wheat
initially was rather constant up to 2007, ﬂuctuating between 0.419 and 0.442 but
after 2008 the wheat share gradually increased up to 0.486. The barley share on the
other hand gradually declined from 2000 to 2015. The rapeseed share initially
increased up to 2007 from 0.157 to 0.217 but then stabilised around 0.2 with a pos-
itive spike of 0.217 in 2013. To summarise, it seems that the growth of the rapeseed
share up to 2007 and the growth in the wheat share after 2007 were both at the
cost of the barley share, that has been gradually decreasing over time. For France
the picture is slightly diﬀerent. The share of wheat seems to have decreased over
time, although there remain ﬂuctuations. The share of barley ﬂuctuates between
0.165 and 0.204 during the whole time period, without a clear trend. The share of
rapeseed grew over time, particularly after 2004. So, for France the growth in the
rapeseed share seems to be at the cost of wheat.
Table 3
Descriptive statistics of dependent and explanatory variables
Germany France
Mean St. dev. Min Max Mean St. dev. Min Max
Acreage shares
Wheat 0.449 0.050 0.323 0.625 0.528 0.149 0.095 0.763
Barley 0.268 0.073 0.126 0.470 0.190 0.074 0.068 0.381
Rapeseed 0.203 0.078 0.076 0.363 0.124 0.064 0.018 0.273
Potatoes 0.030 0.029 0.004 0.125 0.018 0.024 0.001 0.108
Sugar beet 0.050 0.030 0.000 0.120 0.033 0.048 0.000 0.183
Sunﬂower 0.106 0.145 0.000 0.602
Normalised output price indices
Wheat 0.661 0.182 0.365 1.000 1.060 0.205 0.813 1.430
Barley 0.642 0.187 0.348 1.000 0.932 0.183 0.693 1.251
Rapeseed 0.775 0.214 0.427 1.298 1.231 0.265 0.959 1.712
Sugar beet 0.559 0.179 0.317 1.000 0.680 0.209 0.315 1.008
Sunﬂower 1.224 0.255 0.868 1.676
Normalised input price indices
Energy 0.676 0.174 0.321 1.000 1.007 0.188 0.835 1.370
Seeds and
planting stock
0.587 0.175 0.276 1.000 0.899 0.119 0.570 1.080
Fertiliser 0.848 0.260 0.504 1.354 1.153 0.232 0.817 1.759
Plant protection
and pesticides
0.489 0.190 0.204 1.000 0.850 0.134 0.498 1.066
Source: Eurostat (2017c,d,e) and authors’ calculations.
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4.5. Estimation results and discussion
Equation (4) was estimated for the regional shares of wheat, barley and rapeseed in
both Germany and France. Parameter estimates and various test statistics are pre-
sented in Table 5.
For both Germany and France, normalised rapeseed prices have a statistically sig-
niﬁcant negative eﬀect on wheat shares. Interestingly, the normalised rapeseed price
did not have a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on barley prices in both countries. In other
words, rising rapeseed prices lead to a reduction in the share of wheat, but not in the
barley share in both countries. The decline in the German barley share shown in
Table 4 therefore must have had other causes. Using the average values presented in
Table 3, marginal eﬀects of a rapeseed price increase are calculated. For Germany,
the average value for the normalised rapeseed price index was 0.775, so a ceteris pari-
bus 10% increase in the normalised rapeseed price leads to a change in the wheat crop
share by 0.4% (0.057 9 0.078 = 0.004), which is a modest eﬀect. For France, the
average normalised rapeseed price was 1.23, so a 10% rapeseed price increase leads to
reduction in the wheat share of 1.7% (0.141 9 0.123 = 0.017).
Although we cannot compare our results with other econometric crop share studies
that use nation-wide regional data, there are studies that use farm-level data. Using
nation-wide rotating panel data from French grain farmers in the period 1996–2007,
Carpentier and Letort (2014) found that a 10% increase in the oilseeds price reduces
the acreage of wheat by 0.5%, whereas it also reduces the acreage of the aggregated
category ‘other cereals’ by 0.6%. Using a sample of French farmers from the Departe-
ment de la Meuse observed between 2006 and 2009, Bayramoglu and Chakir (2016)
Table 4
Average shares of wheat, barley and rapeseed by year
Germany France
Wheat
share
Barley
share
Rapeseed
share
Wheat
share
Barley
share
Rapeseed
share
2000 0.431 0.301 0.157 0.550 0.172 0.133
2001 0.421 0.307 0.166 0.522 0.200 0.127
2002 0.429 0.281 0.185 0.557 0.187 0.118
2003 0.421 0.295 0.180 0.525 0.204 0.126
2004 0.437 0.279 0.181 0.552 0.186 0.129
2005 0.442 0.272 0.188 0.547 0.181 0.139
2006 0.432 0.282 0.199 0.530 0.184 0.155
2007 0.419 0.269 0.217 0.522 0.185 0.176
2008 0.447 0.274 0.191 0.538 0.191 0.151
2009 0.446 0.260 0.204 0.506 0.201 0.158
2010 0.468 0.235 0.209 0.534 0.172 0.160
2011 0.474 0.234 0.195 0.532 0.165 0.166
2012 0.457 0.252 0.196 0.519 0.180 0.171
2013 0.462 0.232 0.217 0.531 0.174 0.153
2014 0.474 0.232 0.206 0.527 0.186 0.158
2015 0.486 0.241 0.191 0.534 0.189 0.155
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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found that rapeseed prices did not aﬀect wheat shares, but did aﬀect barley shares,
which is opposite to our results for France as a whole.
The results also show that for Germany there are statistically signiﬁcant positive
own price eﬀects and negative cross-price eﬀects for wheat and barley, but for France
this is not the case. In fact, for the French barley share equation none of the nor-
malised crop prices has a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on French barley shares. Con-
cerning the rapeseed share equations we ﬁnd that for Germany none of the crop
prices has a statically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the rapeseed share, although the own rape-
seed price parameter is positive with a P-value of 0.054 (one-sided test). For France
we ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant own price eﬀect of rapeseed and a counterintuitive
positive price eﬀect of barley, and also signiﬁcant negative eﬀects of wheat, sugar beet
and sunﬂower on rapeseed shares. With respect to the included input prices results are
rather mixed. There are various negative price eﬀects, but also a number of counterin-
tuitive positive eﬀects. Moreover, there are diﬀerences for various shares.
Most within R2 values are in the range 0.33–0.53, except for French wheat shares
with a value of 0.15. Accordingly, the null hypothesis that all slope parameters are
jointly equal to zero is ﬁrmly rejected in all cases. The use of a ﬁxed eﬀects estimation
approach is justiﬁed by the outcome of the F-tests on the region-speciﬁc eﬀects. The
null hypothesis that these eﬀects are all similar (absence of constant regional diﬀer-
ences) is ﬁrmly rejected in all cases. The use of Driscoll-Kraay standard errors that
are robust to spatial correlation is necessary given the signiﬁcant test statistics for spa-
tial correlation among the included regions in both countries.
To investigate whether the various biofuel policies discussed in section 2 led to dif-
ferent eﬀects of rapeseed prices on the crops shares, we created various interaction
terms between policy dummies and rapeseed prices and re-estimated the crop share
equations. Table 6 presents the biofuel policies considered, and the rapeseed price
eﬀect before and after the policy change:
The tax exemptions on biodiesel introduced in Germany in 2004 did not lead to a
stronger eﬀect of rapeseed prices on crop shares of wheat, barley, or rapeseed itself.
In fact, the eﬀect on the wheat share became weaker whereas for barley the parame-
ter became insigniﬁcant. After the mandatory blending was introduced in Germany
in 2007 the eﬀect of rapeseed prices became statistically signiﬁcant for wheat (nega-
tive eﬀect) and rapeseed itself (positive eﬀect), but before and after there was no
eﬀect on the barley share. The most notable change from the additional sustainabil-
ity requirements introduced in 2011, which made rapeseed less competitive in biodie-
sel production, was that the rapeseed price did not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
wheat share anymore. The eﬀect on barley became signiﬁcant after 2011, but this is
a counterintuitive eﬀect. The end of the partial tax exemptions in 2013 did not seem
to change the eﬀect of rapeseed prices on shares much with the only notable change
that the negative cross-price eﬀect of rapeseed on barley became statistically
signiﬁcant.
For France we only considered the introduction of production quotas in 2005.
Although these were gradually raised after 2005, together with declining tax exemp-
tions, this did not lead to a fundamentally diﬀerent policy. After introducing this pol-
icy the negative cross-price eﬀect of rapeseed on the wheat share became slightly
larger (statistically signiﬁcant before and after), whereas the own price eﬀect also
slightly increased. The eﬀect on the barley was statistically insigniﬁcant before and
after 2005, in line with the insigniﬁcant parameter for the whole period 2000–2013. To
summarise, after the introduction of this policy rapeseed prices played a slightly more
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important role in acreage decisions with respect to wheat and rapeseed, but not for
barley.
Since most studies on land use in relation to biofuel policies are simulation studies,
there are only a limited number of studies to compare our results with. Hausman
(2012) found for Brazil that prices of sugarcane, a major input in Brazilian ethanol
production, did not aﬀect the sugarcane and soybean area. This suggests that even if
Brazilian biofuel policies aﬀected sugarcane prices, this would not aﬀect the sugarcane
area. This is diﬀerent from our results of a statistically signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of
rapeseed prices on wheat shares in Germany and France, but corresponds to the
absence of an eﬀect of rapeseed prices on the barley shares. Piroli et al. (2012) found
that US acreages of crops used for both biofuels and food/feed (e.g. corn) respond
more strongly to crude price changes than acreages of crops only used for food. This
corresponds to our ﬁndings for barley where there is no eﬀect of rapeseed prices, but
our results for wheat shares show that these can also be aﬀected by rapeseed price
changes that may result from biofuel policies.
5. Conclusions
Since 2003 biofuel policies have been formulated within the EU and its Member
States. These policies are assumed to have increased rapeseed prices due to the
induced higher demand for rapeseed oil for biodiesel production. This has led to
major concerns that acreages for other crops mostly unconnected with biofuel pro-
duction (e.g. wheat) have been reduced, since farmers may respond to higher (relative)
rapeseed prices by increasing the share of rapeseed in total acreage at the expense of
wheat or barley. This study analyses the eﬀect of biofuel policies on rapeseed prices
and the responsiveness of regional shares of wheat, barley and rapeseed to rapeseed
prices in Germany and France, Europe’s largest biodiesel producing countries.
Although the literature shows that there is a theoretical upward eﬀect of biofuel
policies on rapeseed prices, such an eﬀect could not be found with certainty from our
analysis. Whereas biodiesel prices increased with diesel prices, the rapeseed and rape-
seed oil prices did not seem to follow. One explanation for this is that European farm-
ers already anticipated an increased demand and responded by supplying more
rapeseed thereby nullifying the price eﬀect of biodiesel prices. This is in line with the
increasing share of rapeseed in both Germany and France as shown in Table 4.
Another explanation is that a potential increase in demand for rapeseed in Germany
and France is matched by increasing imports. Table 3 showed that rapeseed imports
in Germany were much higher in 2015 than in 2006. However, for France this expla-
nation does not hold since in both years France was a net exporter of rapeseed. We
have not been able to conﬁrm an upward eﬀect of biofuel policies on rapeseed prices
as hypothesised by economic theory.
From the crop share analysis a number of conclusions can be drawn. First, there
was a negative eﬀect of relative rapeseed prices on wheat shares in Germany and
France during the study period, but not for the barley share. Of course this also
implies that when rapeseed prices fell this positively contributed to the wheat share
only. Second, the various policies in Germany and France and changes therein,
aﬀected these price eﬀects diﬀerently. In Germany the mandatory blending introduced
in 2007 led to a stronger negative eﬀect of rapeseed prices on the wheat share and a
stronger own positive price eﬀect, whereas the additional sustainability requirements
introduced in 2011, which made rapeseed oil less competitive for rapeseed production
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made the eﬀect of rapeseed prices on the wheat share disappear. The production quo-
tas introduced in France in 2005 strengthened the eﬀect of rapeseed prices on wheat
and the rapeseed share itself but only modestly.
References
Agreste. Bulletin Mensuel (Castanet Tolosan: Ministere de l’agriculture, de l’agroalimentaire et
de la Fore^t, 2016). Available at: http://agreste.agriculture.gouv.fr/conjoncture/le-bulletin/
article/bulletin-mensuel-8485 (last accessed 24 November 2016).
Baﬀes, J. and Haniotis, T. ‘What explains agricultural price movements?’ Journal of Agricul-
tural Economics, Vol. 67, (2016) pp. 706–721.
Banse, M., vanMeijl, H., Tabeau, A. andWoltjer, G. ‘Will EU biofuel policies aﬀect global agri-
cultural markets?’ European Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 35, (2008) pp. 117–141.
Bayramoglu, B. and Chakir, R. ‘The impact of high crop prices on the use of agro-chemical
inputs in France: A structural econometric analysis’, Land Use Policy, Vol. 55, (2016)
pp. 204–211.
Blanco, M., Burrell, A., Gay, H., Henseler, M., Kavallari, A., M’Barek, R., Domınguez, I. P.
and Tonini, A. Impacts of the EU Biofuel Target on Agricultural Markets and Land Use:
A Comparative Modelling Assessment. (European Commission Joint Research Centre, Refer-
ence Report EUR 24449. Luxembourg: Publications Oﬃce of the European Union, 2010).
Br€ummer, B., Korn, O., Schl€ußler, K. and Jaghdani, T. J. ‘Volatility in oilseeds and vegetable
oils markets: Drivers and spillovers’, Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 67, (2016)
pp. 685–705.
Bureau, J.-C., Guyomard, H., Jacquet, F. and Treguer, D. ‘European biofuel policy : How far
will public support go?’ in M. Khanna, J. Scheﬀran and D. Zilberman (eds.), Handbook of
Bioenergy Economics and Policy (New York: Springer Verlag, 2010, pp. 401–423).
Busse, S., Br€ummer, B. and Ihle, R. ‘Price formation in the German biodiesel supply chain:
A Markov-switching vector error-correction modeling approach’, Agricultural Economics,
Vol. 43, (2012) pp. 545–559.
Cansino, J. M., del Pablo-Romero, M. P., Roman, R. and Y~niguez, R. ‘Promotion of biofuel
consumption in the transport sector: An EU-27 perspective’, Renewable and Sustainable
Energy Reviews, Vol. 16, (2012) pp. 6013–6021.
Carpentier, A. and Letort, E. ‘Multicrop production models with multinomial logit acreage
shares’, Environmental and Resource Economics, Vol. 59, (2014) pp. 537–559.
Charles, C., Keller, M. and Moerenhout, T. Biofuels -At What Cost? A Review of Costs and Ben-
eﬁts of France’s Biofuel Policies. Global Subsidies Initiative of the International Institute for
Sustainable Development, Geneva, 2013. Available at: https://www.iisd.org/gsi/sites/defa
ult/files/bf_costeﬀectiveness_france.pdf (last accessed 17 November 2016).
Council of the EU. ‘Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 of 29 September 2003 establishing
common rules for direct support schemes under the common agricultural policy and estab-
lishing certain support schemes for farmers’, Oﬃcial Journal of the European Union, 21
March 2003. Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=
CELEX:32003R1782&from=nl (last accessed 13 September 2016).
De Gorter, H., Drabik, D. and Just, D. R. ‘Biofuel policies and food grain commodity prices
2006–2012: All boom and no bust?’ AgBioForum, Vol. 16, (2013) pp. 1–13.
De Gorter, H., Drabik, D. and Just, D. R. The Economics of Biofuel Policies. Impacts on Price
Volatility in Grain and Oilseed Markets (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
De Hoyos, R. E. and Saraﬁdis, V. ‘Testing for cross-sectional dependence in panel-data mod-
els’, Stata Journal, Vol. 6, (2006) pp. 482–496.
DESTATIS. Daten zur Energiepreisentwicklung - Lange Reihen (Statistisches Bundesambt,
Wiesbaden, 2016). Available at: https://www.destatis.de/DE/Publikationen/Thematisch/Pre
ise/Energiepreise/Energiepreisentwicklung.html (last accessed 24 November 2016).
 2017 The Agricultural Economics Society
Biofuel policies and crop acreages 857
Driscoll, J. C. and Kraay, A. C. ‘Consistent covariance matrix estimation with spatially depen-
dent panel data’, Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 80, (1998) pp. 549–560.
EIA. Europe Brent Spot Price FOB, 2016. An online resource, available at: https://www.eia.gov/
dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=RBRTE&f=M (Last accessed: 15 April 2016).
European Parliament and Council. ‘Directive 2009/28/EC of European Parliament and of the
Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and
amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC’, Oﬃcial Journal
of the European Union (2009) pp. 16–62. Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/
EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A32009L0028 (last accessed 28 February 2017)
European Parliament and Council. ‘Directive (EU) 2015/1513 of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 9 September 2015 amending Directive 98/70/EC relating to the quality of
petrol and diesel fuels and amending Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of
energy from renewable sources’, Oﬃcial Journal of the European Union, L239 (2015)
pp. 1–29. Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A3
2015L1513 (last accessed 28 February 2017).
Eurostat. Share of Energy From Renewable Sources [nrg_ind_335a]. (Eurostat, 2017a). Avail-
able at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database (last accessed 28 February 2017).
Eurostat. Primary Production - All Products - Annual Data [nrg_109a]. (Eurostat, 2017b).
Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database (last accessed 28 February 2017).
Eurostat. Crop Statistics by NUTS 2 Regions (from 2000 onwards) [agr_r_acs]. (Eurostat,
2017c). Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database (last accessed 28 February
2017).
Eurostat. Price Indices of Agricultural Products, Output (2000 = 100) - Annual Data [apri_
pi00_outa]. (Eurostat, 2017d). Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database (last
accessed 28 February 2017).
Eurostat. Price Indices of the Means of Agricultural Production, Input (2000 = 100) - Annual
Data [apri_pi00_ina] (Eurostat, 2017e). Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/
database (last accessed 28 February 2017).
Eurostat. Crop Sstatistics by NUTS 2 Regions (from 2000 onwards) [agr_r_acs]. (Eurostat,
2017f). Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database (last accessed 28 February
2017).
Fabiosa, J., Beghin, J., Dong, J. F., Elobeid, A., Tokgoz, S. and Yu, T.-H. ‘Land allocation
eﬀects of the global ethanol surge. Predictions from the international FAPRI model’, Land
Economics, Vol. 86, (2010) pp. 687–706.
Feng, H. and Babcock, B. A. ‘Impacts of ethanol on planted acreage in market equilibrium’,
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 92, (2010) pp. 789–802.
Fezzi, C. and Bateman, I. J. ‘Structural agricultural land use modeling for spatial agro-environ-
mental policy analysis’, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 93, (2011)
pp. 1168–1188.
Frees, E. W. ‘Assessing cross-sectional correlation in panel data’, Journal of Econometrics, Vol.
69, (1995) pp. 393–414.
Gilbert, C. L. ‘How to understand high food prices’, Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 61,
(2010) pp. 398–425.
Gohin, A. ‘Impacts of the European biofuel policy on the farm sector: A general equilibrium
assessment’, Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 30, (2008) pp. 623–641.
Hamelinck, C., Koper, M., Berndes, G., Englund, O., Diaz-Chavez, R., Kunen, E. and Walden,
D. Biofuels Baseline 2008 (Utrecht Ecofys), 2011. Available at: http://www.ecofys.com/files/
ﬁles/ecofys_2011_biofuels_baseline(2008).pdf (last accessed 30 November 2016).
Hausman, C. ‘Biofuels and land use change: Sugarcane and soybean acreage response in Brazil’,
Environmental and Resource Economics, Vol. 51, (2012) pp. 163–187.
Hoechle, D. ‘Robust standard errors for panel regressions with cross-sectional dependence’,
Stata Journal, Vol. 7, (2007) pp. 281–312.
 2017 The Agricultural Economics Society
858 Cornelis Gardebroek, Jeﬀrey J. Reimer and Lieneke Baller
INSEE. Prix moyens mensuels de vente au detail en metropole, 2016. Available at: http://
www.bdm.insee.fr/bdm2/aﬀichageSeries?idbank=000442588&page=tableau&codeGroupe=
169&recherche=criteres&periodeDebut=1&anneeDebut=2000&periodeFin=10&anneeFin=
2016 (last accessed 24 November 2016)
Jung, A., D€orrenberg, P., Rauch, A. and Th€one, M. Biofuels – At What Cost? Government Sup-
port for Ethanol and Biodiesel in the European Union – 2010 Update (International Institute
for Sustainable Development, Geneva, 2010). Available at: http://www.iisd.org/gsi/sites/defa
ult/files/bf_eunion_2010update.pdf (last accessed 16 May 2015).
Kaminski, J., Kan, I. and Fleischer, A. ‘A structural land-use analysis of agricultural adapta-
tion to climate change: A pro-active approach’, American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
Vol. 95, (2013) pp. 70–93.
Kretschmer, B., Narita, D. and Peterson, S. ‘The economic eﬀects of the EU biofuel target’,
Energy Economics, Vol. 31, (2009) pp. S285–S294.
Kutas, G., Lindberg, C. and Steenblik, R. Biofuels - at What Cost? Government Support For
Ethanol and Biodiesel in the European Union. (Global Subsidies Initiative of the International
Institute for Sustainable Development, Geneva, 2007). Available at: http://www.iisd.org/gsi/
sites/default/files/subsidies_to_biofuels_in_the_eu_final.pdf (last accessed 7 April 2015).
Laborde, D. and Valin, H. ‘Modeling land-use changes in a global CGE: Assessing the EU bio-
fuel mandates with the MIRAGE-BioF model’, Climate Change Economics, Vol. 3, (2012)
pp. 1–39.
Langpap, C. and Wu, J. ‘Potential environmental impacts of increased reliance on corn-based
energy’, Environmental and Resource Economics, Vol. 49, (2011) pp. 147–171.
Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable Development and Energy. Report on Progress in the Promo-
tion and Use of Energy from Renewable Sources (Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable Develop-
ment and Energy, Paris, 2013). Available at: http://biofuelstp.eu/country/progress-reports/
Article_22_France_report_EN.pdf (last accessed 17 November 2016).
Moore, M. R. and Negri, H. ‘A multicrop production model of irrigated agriculture, applied to
water allocation policy of the bureau of reclamation’, Journal of Agricultural and Resource
Economics, Vol. 17, (1992) pp. 29–43.
Piroli, G., Ciaian, P. and Kancs, d’. A. ‘Land use change impacts of biofuels: Near-VAR evi-
dence from the US’, Ecological Economics, Vol. 84, (2012) pp. 98–109.
Rauch, A. and Th€one, M. Biofuels – At What Cost? Mandating Ethanol And Biodiesel Consump-
tion in Germany. (International Institute for Sustainable Development, Geneva, 2012). Avail-
able at: http://www.iisd.org/gsi/sites/default/files/bf_awc_germany.pdf (last accessed 16 May
2015).
Sorda, G., Banse, M. and Kemfert, C. ‘An overview of biofuel policies across the world’,
Energy Policy, Vol. 38, (2010) pp. 6977–6988.
Timilsina, G. R., Beghin, J. C., van der Mensbrugghe, D. and Mevel, S. ‘The impacts of biofu-
els targets on land-use change and food supply: A global CGE assessment’, Agricultural Eco-
nomics, Vol. 43, (2012) pp. 315–332.
UFOP.Marktinformation €Olsaaten und Biokraftstoﬀe, various issues, 2016. Available at: http://
www.ufop.de/medien/downloads/agrar-info/marktinformationen (last accessed 11 April
2016).
USDA-FAS. EU Biofuels Annual. USDA-FAS GAIN report NL5028 (USDA-FAS, The
Hague, 2015). Available at: http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Biof
uels%20Annual_The%20Hague_EU-28_7-15-2015.pdf (last accessed 10 June 2016).
Wiesenthal, T., Leduc, G., Christdis, P., Schade, B., Pelkmans, L., Govaerts, L. and Geor-
gopoulos, P. ‘Biofuel support policies in Europe: Lessons learnt for the long way ahead’,
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Vol. 13, (2009) pp. 789–800.
Wu, J. J. and Segerson, K. ‘The impact of policies and land characteristics on potential ground-
water pollution in Wisconsin’, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 77, (1995)
pp. 1033–1047.
 2017 The Agricultural Economics Society
Biofuel policies and crop acreages 859
Appendix 1
Table A1
German and French regions with the average size of cropland considered
Country
Region
Cropland
(1,000 ha)* Country Region Cropland (1,000 ha)†
Germany France
1. Baden-W€urttemberg 496.65 14. Alsace 58.00
2. Bayern 1171.44 15. Aquitaine 173.47
3. Brandenburg 372.26 16. Auvergne 196.57
4. Hessen 334.93 17. Basse-
Normandie
280.44
5. Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern
739.50 18. Bourgogne 701.24
6. Niedersachsen 988.43 19. Bretagne 404.59
7. Nordrhein-Westfalen 605.36 20. Centre (FR) 1364.47
8. Rheinland-Pfalz 263.95 21. Champagne-Ardenne 941.86
9. Saarland 18.61 22. Franche-Comte 131.12
10. Sachsen 463.53 23. Haute-Normandie 410.20
11. Sachsen-Anhalt 661.16 24. I^le de France 421.90
12. Schleswig-Holstein 386.84 25. Languedoc-Roussillon 43.24
13. Th€uringen 462.13 26. Limousin 41.37
27. Lorraine 514.26
28. Midi-Pyrenees 536.58
29. Nord - Pas-de-Calais 464.61
30. Pays de la Loire 493.63
31. Picardie 916.74
32. Poitou-Charentes 761.19
33. Provence-Alpes-Co^te d’Azur 27.53
34. Rho^ne-Alpes 195.68
Notes: *Total cropland is calculated by adding average land used for wheat, barley, rapeseed,
potatoes, sugar beet and sunﬂower (France only).
†The numbers for Germany and states are the averages for the years 2000–2015, for France
2000–2013.
Source: Eurostat (2017f) and authors’ calculation.
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